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The regulation of personalised pricing in the digital era 
Note by Marc Bourreau and Alexandre de Streel1 
1. From price discrimination to personalised pricing 
1. Price discrimination. A firm price discriminates when it charges two consumers 
(or the same consumer) different prices for two units of the same product or similar 
products, and the price difference does not reflect cost differences (see generally, OECD, 
2016). A firm price discriminates to extract as much as possible what the consumers are 
willing to pay for its products or services. 
2. Price discrimination is feasible under some conditions: (i) the firm should have 
some market power (price discrimination is not feasible under perfect competition); and 
(ii) there is no or limited possibilities of arbitrage or resale (otherwise, consumers who 
benefit from low prices would have an incentive to resell the goods at higher prices and 
compete with the high-priced versions). The economic literature further distinguishes 
between different types of price discrimination, according to the level of information that 
the firms have about consumers.2 The general idea is that the more accurate the information 
about consumers a firm possesses, the higher its ability to price discriminate and the higher 
the profitability of doing so (US Executive Office of the President, 2015). 
3. Personalised pricing. The availability of big data facilitates price discrimination. 
Firms can use the data that they have collected to infer consumers’ willingness-to-pay. The 
more information a firm can collect about its existing or potential customers, the more 
accurate its estimate of consumers’ willingness-to-pay. To the extent that the firm has some 
market power, it can then set discriminatory prices based on this estimation. At the extreme, 
the firm is able to set individual prices and fully extract consumers’ willingness-to-pay. 
Perhaps more realistically, it is able to engage in group pricing, with small targeted groups 
(e.g., fishing enthusiasts, etc.). We refer to both individual pricing and group pricing with 
small targeted groups as personalised pricing or price targeting.3 
                                                     
1 Marc Bourreau is Professor of Economics at Telecom ParisTech and academic director at the 
Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE) and Alexandre de Streel is Professor of EU and Director 
of the Namur Digital Institute at the University of Namur and academic director at the Centre on 
Regulation in Europe (CERRE). This contribution is partly based on a report we wrote with Inge 
Graef for CERRE: Bourreau, de Streel and Graef (2017). The authors thank Florian Jacques at the 
University of Namur for excellent research assistance and discussion. 
2 The economic literature (Pigou, 1920) distinguishes between first-degree discrimination (or 
personalised pricing), third-degree discrimination (or group pricing) and second-degree 
discrimination (or versioning). See Tirole (1988), chapter 3, or Belleflamme and Peitz (2015), 
chapters 8 to 10, for definitions and a detailed treatment of price discrimination. 
3 Individual pricing corresponds to first-degree price discrimination and group pricing to third-
degree price discrimination. We exclude versioning (second-degree price discrimination) from our 
definition. Indeed, the debate about personalised pricing revolves around situations where 




4. There is no conclusive empirical evidence that personalised pricing actually exists 
in online markets. For example, the report of OFT (2013) argues that personalised pricing 
is technically possible, but found no evidence that it was used by online firms in the UK in 
2012. The CNIL-DGCCRF report (2014) found no evidence of personalised prices based 
on IP address in France in e-commerce websites. In 2017, the Competition and Markets 
Authority in the UK replicated and expanded the study of OFT (2013) and found no 
evidence of personalised pricing (CMA, 2018). Consultants for the European Commission 
conducted a similar study for 8 member states and 4 markets with similar findings (Ipsos 
et al., 2018). In the computer science literature, Vissers et al. (2014) ran a three-week 
experiment with 66 virtual user profiles connecting 25 airlines twice a day, and found no 
evidence of price targeting, though prices were observed to be very volatile.4 
5. But this remains a controversial area. An (in)famous case occurred in 2000 when a 
customer complained that, after erasing the cookies from his computer's browser, he 
obtained a lower price for a particular DVD on Amazon.com. Consumers were very upset, 
and Amazon’s CEO, Jeff Bezos, promised that the company "never will test prices based 
on customer demographics".5 The fear of consumer backlash may explain why targeted 
pricing is hardly observed.6 However, there are subtler – and more acceptable, from a 
consumer viewpoint – ways for a company to achieve the same outcome. 
6. First, firms can offer the same uniform prices to all consumers, but with 
personalised discounts. Since discounts are less easily compared, negative reaction from 
consumers seems less likely. Since consumers end up paying different, personalised, net 
prices, this pricing strategy is equivalent to personalised pricing. Second, a firm can engage 
in search discrimination or steering, which consists in showing different products to 
customers from different groups, based on the available information about consumers. For 
example, the Wall Street Journal (2012) reported that the travel agency OrbitzWorldwide 
was showing more expensive hotel offers to Mac users than to PC users. A similar practice 
has been employed by Staples.com: the same newspaper article revealed that this website 
displayed different prices once the potential buyers’ locations had been identified. The 
studies of CMA (2018) and of Ipsos et al. (2018) also found evidence of steering, 
consumers being shown different search results on some websites based on their operating 
system or the access route to the websites.7 
7. In sum, with the advent of big data, we should expect more personalised prices, 
though firms may have to employ indirect methods (such as personalised discounts or 
search discrimination) to avoid upsetting consumers. 
                                                     
consumers are offered different prices for the same good, which excludes second-degree 
discrimination where firms offer differentiated products in order to price discriminate. 
4 Other types of practices may explain the high variability of online prices. In particular, it may be 
the case that firms use the possibility to change their prices online frequently to explore the demand 
curve (and estimate price elasticities). 
5 See  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amazon.com_controversies#Differential_pricing. 
6 Consumers may perceive personalised prices as ‘unfair’. Xia et al. (2004) argue that this happens 
when consumers observe that they are paying a higher price than the other consumers for a similar 
product. 
7 See also Mikians et al. (2012, 2013) and Hannak et al. (2014) who collected data on various e-
commerce websites and provide some empirical evidence of search discrimination. 




2. Impact of personalised pricing on firms’ profits and economic welfare 
2.1. Impact of personalizing pricing on profits 
8. Monopoly settings. To begin with, consider a monopoly firm (or equivalently, a 
firm with a super dominant position). If the firm can collect precise data about its 
consumers (e.g., demographics, online behaviour, etc.), simple economics shows that it 
may increase its profits by offering personalised prices.8 For example, using a structural 
approach, Shiller (2014) estimates the increase in profit if Netflix would introduce 
personalised prices. According to the author, this would lead to an increase of profit for the 
company between 0.8% (if it used data on consumer demographics) and 12.2% (if it used 
the browsing history of its consumers). Dubé and Misra (2017) conducted an experiment 
on Ziprecruiter, an online recruiting company, comparing the existing uniform price 
charged by Ziprecruiter, an optimized uniform price and targeted prices. They find that the 
firm’s profits increase by 65% when moving from the existing price to the optimized price, 
and increase further by 10% when adopting targeted pricing. 
9. There is one caveat highlighted by the literature, when the monopolistic seller has 
repeated interactions with its consumers and cannot commit to future prices. The 
economics literature shows indeed that intertemporal price discrimination is not optimal 
for the monopolist (see for instance, Stokey, 1979). Acquisti and Varian (2005) revisit this 
result in a model where a monopolist has access to a tracking technology (e.g., putting 
cookies on consumers’ device) and consumers can use an anonymizing technology (e.g., 
by erasing their cookies). Acquisti and Varian show that using past information about 
consumers benefits the monopolist either if a large share of consumers is myopic (i.e., they 
ignore the fact that paying a high price today makes it more likely that they will be offered 
a high price tomorrow) and/or tracking is also used to provide consumers with personalised 
(higher-quality) services. 
10. Competition settings. While a monopoly firm benefit from personalised prices in 
many settings, it is less clear when the firm faces competition. First, consider a situation 
where all competing firms have access to the same information about consumers’ tastes 
and preferences. What is the effect of a switch from uniform to personalised prices? The 
economic literature suggests that if only one firm introduces personalised prices, this firm 
can increase its profit. By contrast, if all firms switch to personalised pricing, the intensity 
of competition can either increase or decrease (see, e.g., Corts, 1998; Taylor and Wagman, 
2014). Therefore, from the industry point of view, the availability of big data containing 
consumer information can be either beneficial or harmful.  
11. So far we postulated that firms in the market have access to the same information 
about consumers. But this is not necessarily the case, for example, when firms obtain data 
about consumers from independent data brokers. Montes, Sand-Zantman and Valletti 
(2018) study a setting where two competitors obtain data from a data broker. They show 
that in equilibrium the data broker sells its data to only one firm, and therefore only one of 
the competing firms can set personalised prices. The firm that has access to the data makes 
higher profits than in the situation without information about consumers, and the firm 
without access to data makes lower profits. In this model, a move from uniform to 
personalised prices decreases total welfare, though consumers benefit from this move.  
                                                     
8 E.g., Belleflamme and Peitz (2015), chapter 8, show that a monopoly makes higher profits if it 
collects more precise information about consumer demand. 




12. To sum up, in a monopoly situation, a firm will benefit from personalised pricing. 
In a competitive environment, it is much less clear; whether firms benefit from personalised 
pricing will depend ultimately on the characteristics of the market. In all cases, the 
profitability of personalised pricing will also depend on consumers’ reaction to this type of 
pricing strategy. 
2.2. Impact of personalised pricing on economic welfare 
13. When a firm sets personalised instead of uniform prices, a trade-off arises: some 
consumers with high willingness-to-pay can be worse off (appropriation effect), while 
some consumers with low willingness-to-pay can be better off (market expansion effect): 
 The appropriation effect means that the firm charges higher personalised prices to 
consumers with high willingness-to-pay compared to the price that they would be 
charged under uniform pricing (note that this is true under monopoly, but not 
necessarily true in a competitive environment); if this is the case, those consumers 
are then worse off with personalised prices; 
 The market expansion effect means the firm charges lower personalised prices to 
consumers with low willingness-to-pay, and some consumers with low willingness-
to-pay who could not afford the good previously under uniform pricing can now 
purchase it with the low personalised prices. 
14. Ignoring other effects, personalised pricing increases the total consumer surplus if 
the demand expansion effect outweighs the appropriation effect, and decreases the total 
consumer surplus otherwise. In a monopolistic context, the economics literature shows that 
either effect can dominate, and thus personalised prices can either increase or decrease 
consumer surplus and social welfare depending on demand conditions.9 For example, 
Bergemann et al. (2015) show that when there is a switch from uniform pricing to price 
discrimination, social welfare and consumer surplus can both increase, both decrease, or 
social welfare increases while consumer surplus decreases. 
15. In a context of imperfect competition, the impact of personalised pricing on 
consumer welfare is also ambiguous. For example, Taylor and Wagman (2014) consider 
different standard models of oligopolistic competition, and show that depending on the 
model, a switch from uniform pricing to personalised pricing can lead to either lower or 
higher consumer surplus. 
16. In sum, the collection of detailed data on consumers’ preferences allows firms, in 
theory at least, to set personalised prices, but it is not necessarily harmful to consumers as 
a whole. However, there might be winners and losers among consumers. Consumers with 
low willingness-to-pay will tend to benefit from personalised pricing, while consumers 
high willingness-to-pay will tend to be hurt. 
3. The regulation of personalised pricing 
17. The regulation of personalised pricing is a complex issue because, on the one hand, 
personalised prices are not very common at this stage and very few case have be dealt with 
by the regulators and, on the other hand, several legal instruments can be applicable. As 
                                                     
9 See, e.g., Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010), Bergemann et al. (2015) and Cowan (2016). 




explained by OECD (2018b), four main instruments apply: rules on consumer protection, 
data protection, competition protection and anti-discrimination. Those rules aim to 
empower consumers by increasing transparency and consumers’ choice and to prohibit 
price discrimination in some circumstances. 
3.1. Consumer protection rules 
18. Consumer protection rules generally apply to B2C relationships, although they 
have been extended to B2B relationships in some jurisdictions. They aim to ensure that 
those relationships remain fair even when consumers usually have less bargaining power 
than the professional traders. To do so, those rules impose several transparency obligations 
on the professional traders such as a clear indication of the prices and prohibit commercial 
practices and contracts terms which are unfair to the consumers such as misleading 
practices or unbalanced terms. 
19. At this stage, in many jurisdictions it is not always clear which information should 
be communicated to the consumers in case of price personalisation, as transparency may 
have different degrees:  
 The first and most basic degree is that consumers are informed that the price they 
are offered is personalised. 
 A most advanced degree of transparency relates to the manner the prices were 
personalised. In this case, the firms may be obliged to indicate the main parameters 
determining the personalised prices. 
 Another advanced degree of transparency relates to the prices offered to others, so 
that a specific consumer can have an anchor price allowing to situate herself across 
the range of prices offered (Ezrachi and Stucke, 2016; Townley et al, 2017).  
20. It is not clear either under which circumstances personalised prices can be 
considered as unfair practice. Thus, the application of the transparency obligation, and 
unfair practices and contract terms prohibition to personalised prices could benefit from 
legal clarification either through case law or through administrative guidance.10 
3.2. Data protection rules 
21. Data protection rules apply to all transactions involving the collection or the 
processing of personal data. They aim to ensure that the privacy and the right to self-
determination of the data subjects are protected. To do so, those rules impose several 
transparency obligations on the data controllers and processors and require the consent of 
the data subjects when their personal data need to be collected or processed. Rules also 
prohibit the processing of some personal data which are particularly sensitive such as data 
on race and ethnic origin, religious or philosophical beliefs, genetic, health or sex life and 
orientation. 
22. As explained by Zuiderveen Borgesius and Poort (2017), data protection rules 
apply when the personalisation involves personal data, which is nearly always the case 
given the broad definition of personal data and their high informative value. One of the 
                                                     
10 In the EU context, some clarifications have been given by the Staff of the European Commission 
(2016) when updating the Guidance on the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to better take into 
account the evolution of the online sector. 




most comprehensive data protection regime is the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), which became recently applicable in the European Union. In case of price 
personalisation involving personal data, the GDPR imposes the provision of information 
on the use of personal data for personalisation, the provision of “meaningful information 
about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of 
such processing for the data subject”,11 and the consent of the data subjects for the use of 
their personal data for the price personalisation. In addition, stricter rules and, in some 
cases, prohibitions apply when the price is personalised on the basis of sensitive data. Thus, 
data protection rules offer more empowerment tools for the data subject than the consumer 
protection rules, although those tools still need to be clarified further with case-law or 
administrative guidance. 
3.3. Competition protection rules 
23. Competition protection rules apply to all transactions concluded by private or 
public undertakings. As generally recognised, they aim to ensure that those transactions 
maximise the total welfare (of the consumers and the producers) in some jurisdictions and 
merely the total consumer welfare in other jurisdictions (see OECD, 2018b, p. 29). To do 
so, antitrust rules prohibit firms’ agreements (in a broad sense) and unilateral conducts by 
firms which are decreasing the total or consumer welfare. 
24. As the effects of personalised prices on economic welfare depend on the market 
characteristics and the specificities of the case at hand, a general per se prohibition of the 
practice by antitrust law is not justified. However, if it can be proved in a specific case that 
the personalisation of the prices decreases total or consumer welfare, the practice is 
prohibited by the antitrust rules. In the EU, Article 101(1d) TFEU and Article 102(c) TFEU 
prohibit specifically anti-competitive discriminatory agreement and abuse of dominant 
position respectively. In this context, discrimination is defined as “applying dissimilar 
conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a 
competitive disadvantage”. 
25. Anti-competitive agreements: a distinction is usually made between horizontal 
agreements among competitors and vertical agreements among firms at different places of 
the same value chain. 
 Regarding horizontal agreements, if competitors agree to charge the same 
personalised prices, this is a standard cartel which is prohibited as any other cartel.12 
 The analysis is more complex when personalised prices are agreed in vertical 
relationships and the personalisation contributes to anti-competitive effects of the 
agreement. In the EU context where the European Commission and the Courts are 
                                                     
11 Article 13(2f) and 14(2g) GDPR. The national data protection authorities in Europe clarified their 
interpretation of this provision by indicating that : ‘The controller should find simple ways to tell the 
data subject about the rationale behind, or the criteria relied on in reaching the decision. The GDPR 
requires the controller to provide meaningful information about the logic involved, not necessarily 
a complex explanation of the algorithms used or disclosure of the full algorithm. The information 
provided should, however, be sufficiently comprehensive for the data subject to understand the 
reasons for the decision’: Article 29 Guidelines (2018, p 25). 
12 Maggiolino (2017). Note that the reliance on pricing algorithms, which may be used for 
personalisation, has also an effect on the factors leading to price collusion, see UK-CMA (2018), 
OECD (2017). 




particularly worry about the partitioning of the single market, vertical agreements 
between suppliers and distributors which entail geographical discrimination on the 
basis of the residence of the consumer are prohibited in many circumstances 
(European Commission, 2017). 
26. Anti-competitive unilateral conducts: A distinction is generally made between 
exclusionary conducts in B2B relationships which are prohibited by antitrust rules in all 
jurisdictions and exploitative conducts in B2C relationships which are prohibited by 
antitrust rules only in some jurisdictions. 
 In B2B relationships, price discrimination and personalisation between firms may 
lead to a (i) secondary-line (or external) discrimination when the dominant firm is 
charging different prices to similar customers and is not competing against those 
customers; or (ii) a primary-line (or internal) discrimination when the dominant 
firm is charging different prices to similar customers and, being vertically 
integrated, is directly competing against those customers. In most jurisdictions, 
both types of discrimination are prohibited by antitrust rules when the 
discrimination is decreasing total or consumer welfare.13 As shown in section 2, 
this requires a case-by-case analysis. 
 In B2C relationships, price discrimination and personalisation between consumers 
could be prohibited by antitrust rules in the jurisdictions where exploitative abuses 
of market power are covered by those rules, such as for instance in the EU, 
Australia, Korea or Turkey.14 The threshold for antitrust intervention, which often 
amounts to price regulation, is always very high in those circumstances as explained 
by the OECD (2011). This is justified given the high risks of errors of antitrust 
intervention against exploitative practices and the relative higher costs of type I 
errors (as antitrust intervention may distort incentives to invest and innovate by 
dominant and small firms) over type II errors (as markets usually self-correct in 
case of exploitative practices, in particular excessive prices). 
27. In the EU, the Court of Justice judged that a price is excessive when: “the difference 
between the costs actually incurred and the price actually charged is excessive, and, if the 
answer to this question is in the affirmative, whether a price has been imposed which is 
either unfair in itself or when compared to competing products’.15 In case of 
personalisation, the determination of the excessive character and the comparison with the 
costs should be made, according to us, against all the prices together and not against each 
individual price, as the normative standard for antitrust intervention is the total consumer 
welfare and not the welfare of each consumer.16  
                                                     
13 Sse O’Donoghue and Padilla, 2013 for analysis of the application EU competition law to 
exclusionary personalised prices. 
14 For an analysis of the EU rules, see Botta and Wiedemann, 2018. 
15 Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission, EU:C:1978:22, point 252, as recently recalled in Case 
C-177/16, AKKA/LAA, EU:C:2017:689, point 36. 
16 In Case C-238/05, Asnef-Equifax v. Asociación de Usuarios de Servicios Bancarios (Ausbanc), 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:734, point 70, the Court of Justice judged that: ‘it is the beneficial nature of the 
effect on all consumers in the relevant markets that must be taken into consideration, not the effect 
on each member of that category of consumers’. 




28. However, some authors like Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), and Graef (2017) suggest 
that antitrust intervention could go further and that the prohibition of exploitative 
personalised prices could be broader. This is related to the current more general debate on 
the role of antitrust in the digital sector and, more broadly, on the objective and the 
normative standard for intervention, being the protection of consumer or total welfare in 
the short term or in the long term, the protection of the competition process, the protection 
of diversity and consumers’ choice or the protection of fairness defined in ex ante 
perspective (equality of opportunities) or ex post perspective (fair distribution of the 
economic surplus).   
3.4. Anti-discrimination rules 
29. Anti-discrimination rules may apply to the actions of the State and private firms. 
Those rules aim at protecting the fundamental right not to be discriminated on the basis of 
some grounds that our liberal democracies find unacceptable. To do so, anti-discrimination 
laws prohibit the use by the administration and by private firms of those grounds to 
differentiate individuals. 
30. In many jurisdictions, international treaties, constitutional norms or legislations 
prohibit the public authorities to discriminate individuals on the basis of sensitive factors. 
For instance, Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the EU prohibits: “any 
discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic 
features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a 
national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation.” Legislations also 
prohibit private firms to discriminate individuals, hence to personalise the prices, on the 
basis of sensitive grounds, although the list of such grounds is generally narrower than for 
public authorities. For instance at the EU level, firms can not discriminate on the basis of 
racial or ethnic origin or sex.17 
31. As one of the fundamental principles of the EU is the non-discrimination between 
its citizens, several provisions prohibit in principle the discrimination, hence the 
personalisation of prices, on the basis of the nationality or the residence of the users.18 
3.5. Summary of the main rules applicable to personalised pricing 
32. The Table 1 below summarises the main conditions of application and the effects 
of the four main legal instruments which have just been described. The Table shows and 
compares the main objectives and scope of each legal instrument, as well as the 
                                                     
17 Council Directive 2000/43 of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, O.J. [2000] L 180/2; Council Directive 2004/113 of 
13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the 
access to and supply of goods and services, O.J. [2004] L 373/37. 
18 Article 18 TFEU ; Article 20 of the Directive 2006/123 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market, O.J. [2006] L 376/36; Regulation 
2018/302 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 February 2018 on addressing 
unjustified geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination based on consumers’ nationality, place 
of residence or place of establishment within the internal market O.J. [2018] L 60/I/1. 




consequences on users and consumers’ transparency and choice and on the prohibition of 
some cases of personalisation when empowerment is deemed to be insufficient. 
33. While some rules can be substitute, in particular the consumer protection and 
personal data protection rules, most of the rules are complementary.19 Indeed, consumer 
protection and data protection rules mainly aim at increasing transparency while 
competition protection and anti-discrimination rules mainly aim at prohibiting some cases 
of price personalisation. The first set of rules allows the consumers to understand better the 
market dynamics and, provided they have alternatives to which they can switch, vote with 
their feet and go to other providers. They also allow the authorities in charge of the second 
set of rules, i.e. antitrust and anti-discrimination agencies, to understand better the basis 
and the effects of the personalised pricing and the need for prohibition. Hence, the first set 
of rules contributes to the effectiveness of the second set of rules. 
Table 1. Conditions and effects of the main rules applicable to personalised pricing (PP) 
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19 On the complementarity between the consumer protection and data protection rules, the Staff of 
the European Commission (2016, p. 26) notes that the violation of data protection rules do not 
always means that the practice would be considered as unfair under consumer protection, but that 
‘such data protection violations should be considered when assessing the overall unfairness of 
commercial practices under the Unfair Commercial Practice Directive, particularly in the situation 
where the trader processes consumer data in violation of data protection requirements, i.e. for direct 
marketing purposes or any other commercial purposes like profiling, personal pricing or big data 
applications.’ 
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4. Remedies and policy recommendation 
34. Although the rapid technical progress in data collection and data analysis makes 
the personalisation of prices easier and less costly, several recent studies across the world 
show that digital firms generally do not personalise their prices. This may be explained by 
the mistrust of the consumers against personalised prices and by the availability of 
alternatives which are more accepted by consumers, such as personalisation of search 
results or discounts. Moreover, economic theory shows that personalised prices are not 
always bad for consumers and their welfare effects depend on the market characteristics 
and the specificities of the case at hand. However, consumers are worry of price 
personalisation especially when based on personal data; their trust is at stake when they do 
not understand well how prices are determined and how their data have been used. To 
maintain trust in the digital services, it is thus important that the legal framework applicable 
to personalised prices is well understood and provides for appropriate obligations which 
are effectively implemented. This last section provides recommendations in that regard. 
4.1. Rules and remedies for personalised pricing in the digital era 
35. The regulation of personalised prices should first and foremost empower the 
consumers by ensuring they are well informed that prices are personalised and by 
maximising as much as possible their choices. However, empowering consumers may not 
be enough in some circumstances and, in those cases, regulation should go further and 
prohibit the personalisation. 
4.1.1. Consumer information 
36.  As the consumers’ mistrust and fear can partly be explained by a lack of knowledge 
about when and how prices are personalised and as information asymmetry can be an 
important market failure in the digital economy (Townley et al., 2017), rules should lead 
to more transparency. According to us, consumer protection rules should ensure that 
consumers are informed about the price personalisation and also about the main parameters 
used for the personalisation.20 Moreover, as recommended by OECD (2018a), those 
                                                     
20 A similar obligation has been proposed by the European Commission for the ranking of online 
offers which is an alternative and more common form of personalisation. In the reform of EU 
consumer protection rules, the so-called New Deal for consumers, the Commission proposes to add 
a new Article 6a in the Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83 imposing that : ‘online marketplace 




information should be disclosed to the consumers in a smart manner taking into account 
the bias and heuristics underlined by behavioural studies. Or, as put by the UK Behavioural 
Insight Team, information disclosure should comply with the EAST framework, i.e. be 
easy, attractive, social and timely. 
4.1.2. Consumer choice and market competition 
37. As transparency to consumers is only useful when they can act upon the information 
and as price personalisation is more likely to be good for consumers when firms compete, 
rules should maximise consumers choices by stimulating competition between providers 
and facilitating consumers switching. Hence, antitrust rules should establish a level playing 
field between all providers and firmly condemn anti-competitive agreements and unilateral 
conducts. Specifically for unilateral conducts, antitrust rules are better at condemning 
exclusionary price personalisation than regulating exploitative price personalisation. In 
addition, independently of the state of competition, users should have the right to oppose 
personalisation especially when it is based on their personal data. Hence, data protection 
rules should require consent when personal data are used for price personalisation. 
4.1.3. Prohibition of some forms of price personalisation 
38. As informed consumers having choices may lead to cases where prices are 
personalised on grounds which are deemed inacceptable in a liberal democracy, rules 
should prohibit those case of personalisation by the public authorities as well as by the 
private firms. 
4.2. The effectiveness of the rules and their enforcement 
39. Legal rules are only piece of paper; they need to be effectively enforced to be 
meaningful. This implies that rules should be clear and sufficiently certain, enforced by 
strong and expert agencies which cooperate between each other at the national and at the 
international levels. 
4.2.1. Clear and legally certain rules 
40. As explained in Section 3, most of the rules applicable to personalised pricing are 
principle-based. Such rules have the advantage of being easily adaptable to new issues 
(such as personalised pricing) but the disadvantage of leaving legal uncertainty until their 
application are clarified by the case-law. To speed up this process of legal clarification, 
which is needed in the digital economy when the technological time is much quicker than 
the judicial time, the enforcement agencies may adopt interpretative guidance as the done 
for example by the Staff of the European Commission (2016) for the Directive on unfair 
commercial practices. 
                                                     
shall (…) provide (…) the main parameters determining ranking of offers presented to the consumer 
as result of his search query on the online marketplace’. The Commission clarified that: ‘the 
obligation to provide information about the main parameters determining ranking of search results 
is without prejudice to any trade secrets regarding the underlying algorithms. This information 
should explain the main default parameters used by the marketplace but does not have to be 
presented in a customized manner for each individual search query’: recital 19 of the Commission 
Proposal of 11 April 2018 for a Directive on better enforcement and modernisation of EU consumer 
protection rules, COM(2018) 185. 




4.2.2. Strong and expert enforcement authorities 
41. The different agencies enforcing the rules on consumer protection, on personal data 
protection, on competition protection and on anti-discrimination should be credible, hence 
they should be sufficiently financed and staffed in particular with computer and data 
scientists understanding the incentives and the process of the prices personalisation in the 
digital era. 
4.2.3. Cooperating enforcement authorities 
42. As different legal rules apply to personalised prices, it is key that the different 
national agencies in charge of those rules cooperate closely between each other to better 
understand the common problems they face and, when intervention is needed, adopt 
consistent decisions. However, institutional cooperation does not mean legal fusion. The 
role of each agency and legal instrument should be differentiated, as they are mainly 
complements and not substitutes. In addition, as many actors of the digital economy are 
global, it is also important that those authorities cooperate at the global or, at least, regional 
level. This is why the European Data Protection Supervisor (2016, p. 15) set up a Digital 
Clearing House, a voluntary network of contact points in regulatory authorities at national 
and EU level who are responsible for regulation of the digital sector.21 
  
                                                     
21 https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/our-work/subjects/big-data-digital-clearinghouse_en 
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